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RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS
DEATh-ACTIONS FOR CAUSING DEATH-WHETHER OR NOT VICTIM'S
CONSENT TO ILLEGAL ABORTION PRODUCING DEATH WILL SERVE TO DEFEAT
AN

ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH-The performance of an abortion with

consent on the part of plaintiff's intestate appears to have given the Appellate Court for the Second District, through the case of Castronovo v.
Murawsky, 1 an opportunity to examine into, and decide for the first time
in this state, the issue as to whether or not such a consent should serve as
a defense to an action for wrongful death produced thereby. 2 The twocount complaint filed therein charged that the decedent went to defendant's
home and while there submitted to an abortion at the hands of the defendant, not a licensed or practicing physician, as the result of which,
and the septicemia developing therefrom, death ensued. The first count
predicated the action on the fact that the defendant's conduct was contrary to the Illinois Criminal Code.3 The second charged that death was
occasioned by negligence and carelessness on defendant's part. A motion
by defendant to dismiss the complaint was sustained in the trial court
and, on appeal, the higher court affirmed this decision when it indicated
that courts ought not lend their aid to those whose injuries have arisen
from voluntary participation in the commission of criminal acts.
Although the decision therein was not cited in the opinion in the
principal ease, it is interesting to note that the case of Bonnier v. Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company,4 passing through the Appellate
Court for the First District, had cleared that tribunal and was pending
on leave to appeal before the Supreme Court at the time the determination in this case was achieved. The Appellate Court, in the Bonnier case,
had held that a plaintiff who sustained a personal injury through the act
of another while himself engaged in an unlawful act did not have a cause
of action against the alleged tort-feasor. The Supreme Court, however,
13 Ill. App. (2d) 168, 120 N. E. (2d) 871 (1954).

2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 1, provides for suit whenever the act or
default was such that, if death had not ensued, the party injured would have

been entitled to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, but
also declares that the wrongdoer shall remain liable even though "the death
shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony."
3 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 3.
42 Ill. (2d) 606, 119 N. E. (2d) 254 (1954), reversing 351 11. App. 34, 113
N. E. (2d) 615 (1953), noted In 32 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 189. Cert. den.
- U. S. -, 75 S. Ct. 53, 99 L. Ed. (adv.) 32 (1954).
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reversed that decision and upheld a trial court judgment for the plaintiff
therein, giving as a reason therefor the proposition that, while an injured
person's violation of law may be evidence of negligence on his part, 5 a
factual question would still remain as to whether or not the illegal act so
performed was a proximate, or at least a concurrent, cause of the injury.
That being so, the court indicated the presence of illegal conduct on the
part of a plaintiff did not automatically disqualify him from seeking relief
at the hands of a court.
It cannot be said that the decision in the Bonnier case settles the
problem raised in the instant case for the situation is slightly different
when the victim has consented to, rather than participated in, the perpetration of the acts in question. It is at this point that the issue is reached
as to whether or not the consent so given should serve to defeat a cause
of action. No prior Illinois case has given a direct answer to this question
but, in a few jurisdictions, the rule which would deny a recovery to one
who has consented to an unlawful act has been opened to permit of an
exception when the act consented to involved the performance of an illegal
abortion, 6 although the majority view, illustrated by the Virginia case of
Miller v. Bennett,7 would be to the contrary. It has been suggested that
the public policy of this state should be one to deny relief in such cases,"
but it should be noted that the Criminal Code, at present, condemns no
more than the conduct of the third person who produces the abortion 9
and says nothing about the culpability of the victim thereof. Such being
the case, there is room for an Illinois court to come to an opposite conclusion from the one achieved in this case.

5 The opinion of the Supreme Court in the Bonnier case, cited in the preceding
footnote, makes no reference to the holding in the case of Gilmore v. Fuller, 198
Ill.130, 65 N. E. 84, 60 L. R. A. 286 (1902). In that case, the plaintiff and the
defendant were participating in a "charivari" party for a young married couple
when plaintiff was accidentally shot by defendant. The court, relying on the
principle ew, dolo malo, non oritur actio, denied recovery when it found that both
parties were involved in a violation of a criminal statute presently set forth in
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 160.
6 In this connection, see Milliken v. Heddesheimer, 110 Ohio St. 381, 144 N. E.
264, 33 A. L. R. 53 (1924), and Martin v. Hardesty, 91 Ind. App. 239, 163 N. E.
610 (1928).
7190 Va. 162, 56 S. E. (2d) 217, 21 A. L. R. (2d) 364 (1949).
8 See note in 45 Ill. L. Rev. 395. The author thereof recommends that the
courts should deny recovery for a willful or negligent injury arising from an
illegal abortion to which the victim has given consent unless a substantial showing could be made to the effect that permitting a recovery in these instances
would result in fewer abortions.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 3.
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ESTOPPEL -

EQUITABLE

ESTOPPEL

-

WHETHER

OWNER-BAILOR

IS

ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING CONVERSION OF AUTOMBILE AGAINST TRUST RE-

plaintiff, in the case
of Mori v. Chicago National Bank,' was the owner of an automobile which
he desired to sell. He delivered possession of the automobile to a used-car
dealer, under a commission arrangement, for the purpose of showing the
same and securing offers for its purchase but retained possession of the
certificate of title.2 The dealer thereafter executed a bill of sale, a trust
receipt, and a promissory note in favor of the defendant bank in return
for money which it then loaned to him. The bank did not require presentation of any certificate of title or other evidence of ownership nor did it
investigate any farther than to ascertain that the car was then in the possession of the dealer. Shortly thereafter the dealer absconded, whereupon
the bank took possession of the automobile and refused to return it to the
plaintiff upon his demand. Plaintiff secured judgment in his favor in a
suit for conversion and the Appellate Court for the First District affirmed
when it held that the bank's reliance upon the dealer's oral representations
of ownership without ascertaining the facts concerning registration precluded the bank from invoking the doctrine of title by estoppel against the
owner-bailor.
CEIPT LENDER WHO DEALS WITH DE.ALER-BAEF--The

Illinois, like most other jurisdictions,3 has adopted the rule that, where
one of two innocent persons must suffer because of the fraud of a third,
the loss is generally to fall on the party who, by his imprudence, negligence,
or culpability, enabled the third person to commit the fraud. 4 On this
basis, owners have been held to be estopped from asserting title as against
bona fide purchasers for value where not only has possession been surrendered but, in addition, some other evidence of ownership or authority
to sell or encumber the entrusted chattel has been provided. 5 The problem
becomes more acute when possession, without more, is given to a dealer
selling similar chattels in the ordinary course of business. While, in
Drain v. LaGrange State Bank,6 it was said that such a possession would
13 Ill. App. (2d) 49, 120 N. E. (2d) 567 (1954).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 951/, § 76, requires that a certificate of title
be secured as a condition precedent to registration and operation of a motor
vehicle.
3 See annotation in 18 A. L. R. (2d) 813 and 19 Am. Jur., Estoppel, § 68 et seq.
4 Western Union Cold Storage Co. v. Bankers' National Bank, 176 Ill. 260,
52 N. E. 30 (1898).
5 In Mason v. Shelton, 292 Ill. App. 640, 11 N. E. (2d) 224 (1937), an owner
who gave a dealer authority to sell his automobile was not entitled to repossess,
as against a bona fide purchaser thereof, notwithstanding the fact that the owner
limited his authorization to sell so as to retain title pending delivery of a new
car by the dealer, where the purchaser was given no notice of the reservation.
6 303 Ill. 330, 135 N. E. 780 (1922).
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be one of the indications of title, the court held that the mere giving
possession of chattels, absent any other evidence, would not be enough
enable the possessor to give good title for it was considered necessary,
the conduct of business affairs, that men should have7 this safeguard
business was to be transacted in a satisfactory fashion.

of
to
in
if

Other aspects and ramifications are apt to arise when possession has
been delivered by manufacturers, wholesalers, or other conditional vendors
to retail dealers for the apparent purpose of resale in contrast to those
cases where the initial transaction is not one of sale but is, rather, a consignment, bailment or agency for a special purpose unaccompanied by any
authority to sell, express or implied, or other indicia of title beyond the
fact of possession. In the first of these instances, the Illinois courts have
held that a condition that title is to remain in the seller until certain conditions have been met would be ineffectual as against a bona fide purchaser
from the retailer s for, to hold otherwise, would impede commercial transactions9 while making the individual buyer the possible dupe of every
type of fraud. 10 By contrast, in the second situation, the courts, realizing
that these relationships are of equal importance to commerce," have said
that the proper, lawful and convenient conduct of the owner should not
be turned to his disadvantage.
Assuming that a basis can be established for a finding of estoppel on
the part of the owner, the instant case becomes more important for it
emphasizes the fact that the conduct of the one seeking the benefit of the
estoppel must also be scrutinized.' 2 In that connection, since an automobile was involved, the question became one as to whether or not the
party claiming possession adversely to the rights of the real owner should
See also 24 R. C. L. 375.
Commercial Credit Co. v. Horan, Bailiff, 325 Ill. App. 625, 60 N. E. (2d) 763
(1945); L. B. Motors, Inc. v. Prichard, 303 Ill. App. 318, 25 N. E. (2d) 129
(1939); Ford Motor Co. v. National Bond & Investment Co., 294 I1. App. 585.
14 N. E. (2d) 306 (1938) ; Mason v. Shelton, 292 Il1. App. 640, 11 N. E. (2d) 224
(1937); Gordon 'Motor Finance Co. v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 261 Ill. App. 536
(1931); National Bond & Investment Co. v. Shirra, 255 I1. App. 415 (1930):
Illinois Bond & Investment Co. v. Gardner, 249 Ill. App. 337 (1928).
9 Illinois Bond & Investment Co. v. Gardner, 249 Ill. App. 337 (1928).
10 Gordon Motor Finance Co. v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 261 Il. App. 536 (1931).
11Drain v. LaGrange State Bank, 303 Ill. 330, 135 N. E. 780 (1922); Commercial Credit Corporation v. Horan, Bailiff, 325 Ill. App. 625, 60 N. E. (2d) 763
(1954): Ford Motor Co. v. National Bond & Investment Co., 294 Ill. App. 585,
14 N. E. (2d) 306 (1938). See also annotation in 57 A. L. R. 393.
In
12 Czesna v. Lietuva Loan & Savings Association, 252 Ill. App. 612 (1929).
General Finance Corp. v. Nimrick, 319 Ill. App. 98, 48 N. E. (2d) 543 (1943),
7

8

it was said that a finance company would have the burden of showing that it did
not know of the owner's title, had no ready means of ascertaining the purpose
for which the automobile was left with the dealer, and had relied on the dealer's
appearance of ownership.
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be required to show that he had demanded and inspected the certificate of
title or, in the absence of such a showing, should be prevented from invoking the doctrine of estoppel. The Illinois version of the certificate of title
statute appears to be an anti-theft provision 3 for it does not make it
mandatory that a certificate of title accompany the sale of an automobile
before the purchaser is to be protected in his purchase. 1 4 Nevertheless,
it has been held that a certificate of title would furnish a ready means of
ascertaining the true ownership of the automobile 15 so a failure to get
access to the certificate could well be an indication of negligence on the
part of the purchaser. As a defendant in the instant case saw fit to place
reliance upon the dealer's representations of ownership without making
resort to a readily ascertainable means of verifying ownership, there is
sound reason to preclude it from invoking the doctrine of estoppel.

EXECUTORS

AND

ADMINISTRATORS -

ALLOWANCE

AND

PAYMENT

OF

CLAIMS--WHETHER DIRECTION TO EXECUTOR TO PAY REASONABLE AMOUNT
FOR SUPPORT op TESTATRiX AMOUNTS

TO A LEGACY, HENCE MAKES FILING

OP CLAIM UNNECESSARY-A seemingly common yet

nevertheless unusual

problem appears to have been presented in the recent case of In re Yocum's
Estate' wherein the testatrix, in the first item of her will, made the usual
general direction for payment of her debts and, in the second item, provided for the division of her estate among her children equally but subse-

quently added a codicil amending the first item by adding a direction to
the executor to pay one of the children a reasonable sum for support and
care in the event the testatrix made her home with that child. Following
probate of the will and codicil, a claim date was set and notice thereof
was published in conformity with the statute.2 Subsequent thereto, a final
account was filed showing payment of all claims which had been presented
and listing the amount and method for distribution. Objections were
filed to this account by the particular child on the premise she had not
been paid, or allowed, a reasonable sum for the support and care given
her mother. The trial court, at the instance of the other beneficiaries,
overruled these objections on the ground the child had failed to file a
13 Il. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 951/, §§ 74-93.
14 The case of L. B. Motors, Inc. v. Prichard, 303 Ill. App. 318, 25 N. E. (2d)
129 (1939), indicates that the statute in question is not a "recording" act which
would compel a purchaser to look to the certificate of title to determine whether
the seller was the owner.
15 See General Finance Co. v. Nimrick, 319 I1. App. 98, 48 N. E. (2d) 543
(1943).

1 Sub nom. Priddle v. Barber, 2 Ill. App. (2d) 472, 119 N. E. (2d)
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 346.

819 (1954).
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claim in support of her demand for payment8 and, on appeal to the circuit
court, where the cause was heard de novo,4 a similar motion to strike the
objections was sustained. On further appeal, the Appellate Court for the
Third District affirmed the action so taken when it said that the codicil
did not indicate an intention to make the particular child a legatee with
respect to the support item, hence it was necessary for her to file a claim
against the estate for the allowance of this sum. 5
While it does not appear that this precise factual situation has been
passed upon before in Illinois, a similar problem was presented in the
Missouri case of Rowe v. Strother6 wherein a testatrix gave direction to her
executor to pay her doctor a reasonable sum for services in addition to
amounts she had already paid. This direction appeared in a later paragraph of the will, the first item of which contained the customary and
general direction for the payment of debts. Despite this position of the
controlling language, the court, denying that the doctor was a legatee,
said that the direction indicated the existence of an acknowledged debt
rather than an intention to provide a legacy. 7 By contrast, in the California case of Estate of Barclay s the controlling language was incorporated
in the residuary clause of the will and, because of its position, was declared to amount to a legacy.
Faced with a choice of views on the subject, the court in the instant
case preferred to base its decision on the Missouri holding, not so much
because of identity in the language used or as to its location in the will
but because, in the two cases, the prime factor bore strongly upon the
question of intention. In that connection, the court noted that, as between
members of the same family, there would be a strong presumption that
3 Ibid., Ch. 3, § 344, specifies the information which should be supplied with
the. verified claim.
4 Ibid., Ch. 3, § 487.
5 Ibid., Ch. 3, § 356, operating as a short statute of limitation, cut off the possibility of a late filing, so the objector would, under the holding, be entitled to
no more than that portion of the estate due to her as one of the residuary
legatees named in item 2 of the will.
6341 Mo. 1149, 111 S. W. (2d) 93 (1937).
7 In
Fair v. Fair, 46 Ohio App. 51, 187 N. E. 727 (1933), the testator's will
stated: "I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses be paid, including
in my debts a reasonable compensation to be paid to [petitioner] for caring and
nursing me." Although the court said that the petitioner was a legatee, so the
only question to be decided was what would be a "reasonable" amount, it should
be noted that the court did not directly face the issue presented by the instant
case because, in that case, a claim had been filed against the estate. Compare
this case with the holding in the earlier Pennsylvania case of In re Fehls' Estate,
13 Pa. Super. 601 (1900), where the court, under a will which recognized that
the estate should be indebted to a son for care and support provided but which
did not fix the amount of the indebtedness, nevertheless required the son to prove
his claim in the ordinary way.
8152 Cal. 753, 93 P. 1012 (1908).
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the services rendered by one to the other would be gratuitous in character
unless an express contract to the contrary was made to appear.9 The
present case, therefore, should serve as a reminder that it is essential to
use clear and appropriate legal terminology in the drafting of wills if the
true intention is to prevail for ambiguous directions, which may be indicative but are lacking in definiteness, will not suffice.

GAMING

-

CRIMINAL

RESPONSIBILITY

-

WHETHER

MERE

RECEIPT

OF

MONEY BET AND MEMORANDUM WITH RESPECT THERETO BUT WITHOUT ANY
RECORDING

THEREOF CONSTITUTES VIOLATION

OF STATUTE AGAINST

BOOK-

MAKING--A significant point for law-enforcement officials appears to have

been made through the medium of the recent case of People v. Lloyd." It
appeared therein that an Illinois sheriff, suspecting the presence of possible
organized book-making operations in his county, arranged with a private
detective agency to entrap the suspected gambler. Pursuant to arrangement, a female operative of the detective agency handed to the defendant,
suspected of gambling, a sum of money and a slip of paper on which had
been written the name of a race horse and the number and date of the
race in which it was entered. The defendant examined the memorandum,
folded it up, and placed it, with the money, in his pocket but said nothing
nor made any written record of the transaction. The defendant was arrested shortly thereafter and, on demand, surrendered the note and the
money to the sheriff. Tried on an information charging violation of an
Illinois statute making it an offense to keep a "book, instrument or device"
for the purpose of "recording or registering" bets or wagers upon the
result of any "trial or contest of skill, speed or power of endurance of
man or beast," 2 the defendant was found guilty on a jury verdict and
sentenced to pay the maximum fine and to be imprisoned for a period in
the county jail. On defendant's appeal to the Appellate Court for the
Second District, a misdemeanor being involved,3 the conviction was reversed, without remand, when that court decided the acts charged to the
defendant were insufficient to satisfy the elements of the crime charged.
Interest in the decision so achieved is generated not so much from
the fact that the case is the first of its kind from the factual standpoint
but also because it tends to illustrate the inadequacy which exists in the
effectuation of the legislative purpose at the time it enacted the statute
9 See Porter v. Porter, 287 Ill. 401,
v. Martin, 101 Ill. App. 640 (1901).

123 N. E. 59, 7 A. L. R. 1041 (1919) ; Martin

13 Ill. App. (2d) 257, 121 N. E. (2d) 329 (1954).
2 I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 336.
2 Ibid., Ch. 38, § 780 .
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there interpreted. Notice has previously been taken of the fact that neither
the state constitution 4 nor the Criminal Code 5 contains a total prohibition
on all forms of gambling.' Such regulations as do exist have, more nearly
been directed at the professional type of gambler, rather than the casual
or occasional wagerer, with the general result that these provisions have
been given a narrow instead of a liberal construction. 7 Viewed in that
light, the decision in the instant case appears to be a correct one for, unlike
the situation found in the case of People v. Semmler s the defendant at
hand neither used a "book, instrument or device " nor recorded or registered any bet, other than as he may have done so mentally. It is evident,
then, that the statute in question possesses certain inherent weaknesses 9
and could well bear amendment. If amended, it should provide that,
among other things, the mere acceptance of a bet by one who makes an
occupation of that activity should be deemed to be a crime.

INSURANCE -

MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE -

WHETHER BY-LAW

OF

MUTUAL ORGANIZATION FOR PAYMENT OF DEATH BENEFIT IN A STATED SUM

IN CASE OF DEATH OF MEMBER CREATES AN ENFORCIBLE OBLIGATION-A

significant principle to be considered in the construction of mutual benefit,
trade union, or similar insurance plans appears to have been given credence
by the decision in the recent case of Davis v. Chicago Truck Drivers,

Chauffeurs and Helpers Union of Chicago and Vicinity, Local 705.1 The
plaintiff therein, claiming as the designated beneficiary, sued to recover the
amount of a stated death benefit provided for by the rules and regulations
of the defendant trade union of which her husband had been a member in
good standing. The defendant, by answer, set up the rules and regulations
of the association2 to defeat recovery, together with a special defense that
Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, §27.
a Il. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, §§ 32448.
0 See note in 30 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 148-54 on the subject of the
validity of "not for profit" lotteries.
7 See, for example, People v. Dorman, 415 Ill. 385, 114 N. E. (2d) 404 (1953),
affirming 347 I1. App. 317, 106 N. E. (2d) 842 (1952), wherein Ill. Rev. Stat.
1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 139, was declared not to extend to the point of making a
conspiracy to keep book into a felony.
In that case, the court held that the
8345 Ill. 272, 178 N. E. 100 (1931).
defendant's use of pieces of cardboard, on which had been written certain numbers and names of horses, was sufficient to show that the defendant kept a book.
See also annotation in 153 A. L. R. 464.
9 See comment in 48 Northwestern L. Rev. 239 for other suggested deficiencies
in the statute.
13 Ill. App. (2d) 230, 121 N. E. (2d) 353 (1954).
2 The union rules and regulations specified that, among other things, upon the
death of a member, "a benefit of Twenty-five Hundred ($2,500) Dollars shall be
paid . . . The payment of such death benefit is a matter of organizational privi4
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the deceased had committed suicide,3 contending that the payment of
benefits was a matter of organizational privilege and welfare to be granted
or denied wholly within the discretionary province of the union. Judgment was, however, pronounced in favor of the plaintiff on a jury verdict
for the stated amount after defendant's motions for judgment non obstante
veredicto and for new trial had been overruled. The Appellate Court for
the First District affirmed this judgment on the basis that the presence
of a stated amount, and the absence of any provision forbidding suit,4
in the defendant's regulations served to make the provision for the payment of death benefits into a legally enforcible one.
It could have been remarked, over thirty years ago, that a turning
point had been reached in the Illinois law relating to trade union and
similar benefit plans when the Supreme Court decided the case of Kelly v.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen5 for it then placed Illinois squarely in
line with the weight of authority elsewhere.8 Despite earlier cases to the
contrary, 7 the rule thereby became one which denied the existence of a
legally enforcible right in the event the claim was not specifically provided
for in the certificate but had to be addressed to the systematic benevolence
of the association. Even so, recognition was there accorded to the possibility that contractual rights could arise, particularly where the benefit
certificate (1) called for the payment of a precise sum (2) on the happening of a specified event and (3) contained no prohibition against suit.s
Most union benefit plans drafted since then, except those wherein the
cost has been placed at the employer's door, have been studiously drawn
lege and welfare and does not constitute a contract of life insurance or any other
contract between the Organization and its members or the Organization and any

claimant of benefits." See 3 Ill. App. (2d) 230 at 231, 121 N. E. (2d) 353 at 354.
3 The question of suicide as a bar to recovery was disposed of by verdict of
the jury that the deceased was Insane at the time he took his life, hence was
incapable of knowing the nature or consequences of his act. On this point, see
the case of Central Mutual Life Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, 195 Ill. 135, 62 N. E. 838
(1902).
4 A further regulation to the effect that the organization should not be subject
to "any claim, suit, garnishment or attachment by any person" on account of any
direction respecting the manner of "disbursing" death benefits was treated as
being inapplicable to a suit by the beneficiary for the stated amount.
5308 Ill. 508, 140 N. H. 5 (1923).
6 See annotation in 29 A. L. R. 250.
7 Bond v. Grand Lodge, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 165 Ill. App. 490
(1911) ; Convery v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 190 Ill. App. 490 (1911).
See also annotation in 27 A. L. R. 869.
8The holding in Railway Passenger and Freight Conductors Mutual Aid &
Benefit Ass'n v. Robinson, 147 Ill. 138, 35 N. E. 168 (1893), was distinguished,
rather than overruled, at the time of the decision in the Kelly case, cited in
note 5 ante. It Is interesting to note that no mention is made, in the opinion in
the instant case, of the holding in the Robinson case.
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to avoid the semblance of any contractual rights. As a result, benefits
under such plans have been paid, if at all, only when union officials have
seen fit. Moreover, at times when benefit funds have been threatened with
depletion, many of the plans so drafted were rescinded, not without some
grumbling on the part of those who had made more or less enforced contribution thereto. It is possible that some of this dissatisfaction may have
been accorded notice by the court concerned with the instant case for it
seized on the presence of the precise factors mentioned above as evidence
of the existence of contractual rights whereas other language in the certificate purportedly forbade the taking of this view. It would appear,
then, that if union benefit plans are to be regarded as no more than
matters of organizational privilege, they must be scrupulously drawn to
avoid any semblance to insurance certificates, whether of fraternal or of
commercial character, or else be treated for what they are, i.e., contracts
between the union and its members.

JOINT

TENANCY-SURvIvORSHIFP-WEmTHER

PARoL

EVIDENCE IS

AD-

MISSIBLE TO CONTROVERT RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP BASED ON WRITTEN JOINT

TENANCY AGREEMENT RELATING TO PERSONALTY-The decedent's executor,
in the recent case of In re Schneider's Estate,1 claimed that he was entitled
to recover from an alleged surviving joint tenant certain funds which had
been deposited in two joint savings accounts. It appeared that the decedent, being in ill health and desirous that someone in addition to himself should be able to withdraw money in the event he became too ill to
make personal withdrawals, entered into certain written joint savings account agreements with the respondent. 2 It was also admitted by the respondent that all the funds on deposit in the accounts had been owned
by the decedent prior to and at the time they were so deposited. Following the death of the decedent and withdrawal of the funds by respondent,
the executor petitioned for a citation to discover assets, 3 which citation,
after a full hearing, was dismissed and the respondent discharged. On
trial de novo,4 over objection, evidence of the foregoing facts was admitted and it was then adjudged that the funds in the accounts were the
property of the decedent and the respondent was ordered to account for
the same. On further appeal, that judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District when it acknowledged the right of the
12 Ill. App. (2d) 560, 120 N. E. (2d) 353 (1954). Leave to appeal has been
granted.
2111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 76, § 2, requires that an agreement of this
character be "signed by all said persons at the time the account is opened."
3 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 335.
4 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 3, §§ 484 and 487.
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executor to introduce parol evidence to explain that the joint tenancy
agreements were executed solely for the convenience of the decedent, who
had made the only deposits in the accounts, thereby leading to the defeat
of the ordinary inference as to rights of survivorship which normally
attend upon the making of agreements of this character.
While the precise factual situation presented in the instant case is
not novel,' the decision achieved therein is significant for the case represents
the first holding in which an Illinois court has deemed it proper to allow
the use of parol evidence to controvert express provisions contained in
a written joint savings agreement.8 Generally, in such cases, one of two
theories is relied upon to determine the rights of the surviving codepositor; the gift theory or the contract theory. The first of these would
permit the introduction of parol evidence or the use of any appropriate
presumption to determine whether the decedent actually had an intent to
bestow title by way of gift on the surviving co-depositor.7 By contrast,
a reliance upon the contract theory would generally preclude the admission
of parol evidence in the event the deposit agreement was complete and
unambiguous on its face and no fraud, undue influence, or mistake was
present.8 This latter view was accepted by the Appellate Court in the
case of Cuilini v. Northern Trust Company,9 which case might be said to
represent the prevailing theory in this state up to the time of the holding
in the instant one. Rejecting the principle there applied, the court now
expresses no sense of reluctance in stating that the rule previously followed was an unjust one which operated to disregard the equitable rights
of the parties, thereby making the law into an instrument of injustice. It
is doubtful, however, that the court was intending to express a dislike for
the parol evidence rule in general, so the decision may have to be held
within the narrow bounds of the joint tenancy relationship.

5 See note in 43 Ill. L. Rev. 872 wherein a number of prior Illinois cases have
been considered.
6 The case of Kane v. Johnson, 397 Ill. 112, 73 N. E. (2d)
321 (1947), treats
with the right to question the effect to be given to a deed conveying real estate
in joint tenancy.
7 Taylor v. Grimes, 223 Iowa 821, 273 N. W. 898 (1937) ; Stiles v. Neschwander,
140 N. J. Eq. 591, 54 A. (2d) 767 (1947). It should be noted that the respondent
herein expressly disclaimed the right to hold the funds in question as an executed
gift.
s In re Estate of Koester, 286 Ill. App. 113, 3 N. E. (2d) 102 (1936).
9 335 Ill. App. 86, 80 N. E. (2d) 275 (1948). Leave to appeal was there denied.
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PLEADING--MOTIONS-WWHETHER

COURT MAY DECIDE DISPUTED FACT

Dismiss-A procedural question
concerning the proper application of Subsection 3 of Section 48 of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act' was recently presented to the Appellate Court
for the Second District in the case of Kovalik v. Baldwin.2 Plaintiff had
there instituted a suit, with demand for jury trial,8 against four defendants seeking to declare a sale of certain securities to be null and void for
violation of the Illinois Securities Law. 4 Subsequent to the filing of
QUESTIONS AT HEARING ON MOTION TO

answers and replies thereto and prior to trial, one of the defendants

changed his attorneys. This defendant then filed a verified motion for
permission to withdraw his answer and for leave to file a verified motion
to dismiss the complaint,5 in which motion it was alleged that the plaintiff
had released the particular defendant from any and all liability. 6 Plaintiff responded with a verified answer to the latter motion in which each
allegation thereof, including a charge of execution of the release, was
denied. The trial court, without hearing evidence, sustained the motion
to dismiss the suit as to this defendant. On plaintiff's appeal, the Appellate Court reversed this decision, declaring that the Civil Practice
Act provision was clearly applicable and that, under the terms thereof,
the trial court was bound to deny the motion to dismiss without prejudice
because disputed questions of fact were involved.
A careful analysis of the subsection in question discloses that it pos-

sesses a dual character, enabling either of the parties to the litigation to
seek a favorable ruling
ture gave to the courts
puted questions of fact
this discretion away in

1Ill.

under its provisions.'
of the state a degree
on motion practice, it
those cases (1) where

But, at the time the legislaof discretion to decide disdid, at the same time, take
a disputed question of fact

Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172(3).
23 Ill. App. (2d) 210, 121 N. E. (2d) 53 (1954).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 188.
4 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 121Y, § 96 et seq. The statute was repealed and replaced
by ibid., Ch. 121%, § 137.1 et seq., but existing causes of action were preserved
by ibid., Ch. 1211/2, § 137.16.
5 It was urged, on appeal, that it was error for the trial court to allow the
defendant to withdraw his answer and enter a motion to dismiss since the issues
had been formed and the case was ready for trial. The court, on the basis of the
decision in Morris v. Goldthorp, 390 Ill. 186, 60 N. E. (2d) 857 (1945), disposed
of this contention by indicating that, in the absence of a showing that the
appellant had lost some rights or had been damaged in some way, the trial court
had not abused the wide discretion vested in it.
6111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172(1) (g), authorizes the use of a
motion when "the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been
released."
7 In general, see Weisbrod, "Some Observations on Section 48 of the Illinois
Civil Practice Act," 16 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 118-50 (1938), particularly pp.
142-7.
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existed provided (2) the action was one at law and (3) the opposite party
had demanded that the case be submitted to a trial before a jury.8 While
use has been made of this practice in a number of prior cases, 9 the instant
case appears to be the first in which the operative effect of the aforementioned limitation has been squarely involved and in which a genuine controversy had been generated by the presence of contradictory affidavits. 10 By
deciding the case as it did, the court saved the statute from being exposed
to any possible criticism on the ground that it violated the constitutional
right to trial by jury in law actions." A contrary holding might well
have opened the door for the disposition of cases on affidavits only, a practice to be condemned in view of the fact that the several affiants would
not be exposed to such tests as to credibility and the like as is afforded by
12
an opportunity for cross-examination.

TRUSTs-CREATION,

EXISTENCE,

AND

VALIDITY-WHETHER

SETTLOR-

TRUSTEE'S RESERvATION OF INCIDENTS OF OwERasHIP IN TRUST RES REQUIRES INVALIDATION OF INTER-vIvos TRUST AS AN ATTEMPTED TESTAMENTARY DisPoSrtioN-The line of demarcation between a valid inter-vivos

trust and an attempt to make a testamentary disposition without complying with the statutory requirements for the execution of wills' was again
8 ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172(2), authorizes the use of a motion
to dismiss by the plaintiff in the event the defendant has filed a counterclaim.
9 See, for example, the cases of Hummel v. Cardwell, 335 Ill. App. 337, 81 N. E.
(2d) 381 (1948): Skidmore v. Johnson, 334 Ill. App. 347, 79 N. E. (2d) 762
(1948); and Chandler Society v. Shenk, 334 Ill. App. 373, 79 N. E. (2d) 757
(1948). These suits were in equity, where trial by jury would be permitted, at
best, only in the event the chancellor exercised a discretion to that end. No
constitutional issue with respect to a right to trial by jury could be developed
in cases of that character.
10 In the wrongful death case of Fitzpatrick v. Pitcairn, 371 Ill. 203, 20 N. H.
(2d) 280 (1939), noted in 17 CmCAo0-KFNT LAw Ravyiw 372, the plaintiff's
counter-affidavits were deemed to be insufficient to generate a debatable issue of
fact, hence it was held proper to dispose of the case on motion practice. A
similar result appears to have been attained In an action on the bond involved
in Marshall v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 318 Ill. App. 636, 48 N. E. (2d) 804

(1943), abst. opin. In Sacks v. American Bonding Co. of Baltimore, 340 I1. App.
564, 92 N. E. (2d) 510 (1950), a denial of the right to use motion practice with
supporting affidavits against a counterclaim was upheld because the ground
relied on was not included within Section 48(1) of the Civil Practice Act, but the
court did say that it would have been proper to deny the motion anyway inasmuch as a jury demand was pending in the case.
11 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 5.
12 See also the case of Leitz v. Ankrom, 350 Il. App. 437, 113 N. E. (2d) 184
(1953), wherein the court expressed itself forcefully on the matter of disposing
of a motion to vacate a judgment by confession on the basis of conflicting
affidavits which had been filed pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110,
§ 259.26.
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 194.
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put in dispute in the recent case of Farkas v. Williams.2 The suit was
one brought by the administrators of an estate to determine the validity
of certain unwitnessed documents purporting to be declarations of trust
signed by the decedent which were found, along with certain applications
for corporate capital stock which formed the corpus of the trust, in the
safety deposit box of the decedent. The applications for the stock stated
that the shares were to be issued in the decedent's name as trustee for the
defendant Williams, an employee of the decedent who had lived on the
decedent's premises and had been paid "some kind of salary." In the
accompanying declarations of trust, the settlor reserved to himself the
right to receive all dividends paid during his lifetime for his personal use,
to vote the shares, to sell or otherwise deal with the stock,3 to change the
beneficiary, and to revoke the trust, but did declare that, upon his death,
the title to the stock and the right to all further dividends should vest
absolutely in the beneficiary. The cause having been submitted upon the
pleadings and a stipulation as to the facts, the trial court rendered a
decree for the administrators. Upon appeal, the Appellate Court for the
First District affirmed this decree on the ground no trust arose since the
decedent, during his lifetime, had absolute dominion over the property
involved, performed no duties as trustee, and owed no equitable obligations
to the beneficiary. As the instruments also failed to meet the requirements for a valid will, the attempted disposition of the decedent's property
necessarily failed.
Prior to the holding in the instant case, the courts of Illinois, as in
the case of Kelly v. Parker4 and subsequent cases, 5 appear to have been
extremely liberal in their effort to uphold the validity of inter-vivos trusts
even though the settlor may have reserved large powers over the trust
property. Despite this, the court concerned with the instant case purported to distinguish the situation before it from the ones found in these
23 I1. App. (2d) 248, 121 N. E. (2d) 344 (1954). Leave to appeal has been
granted.
3 It was provided that, In the event of a sale or redemption of the stock or
any part thereof, the trust was to terminate as to the stock so sold or redeemed,
with the decedent being entitled to use the proceeds so created for his own use.
4 181 Ill. 49, 54 N. E. 615 (1899). The settlor there had executed a deed conveying certain realty to trustees but reserving the right to use, occupy, manage,
control, improve, lease, mortgage, or sell and convey the premises. In addition,
he reserved the right to enjoy all rent and profit as If he were the owner In fee
simple, together with the right to revoke the conveyance and all trusts created.
The court, Magruder, J., dissenting, upheld the validity of the trust.
5 See, for example, Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 356 Ill. 612,
191 N. . 250 (1934), affirming 268 Ill. App. 518 (1932); Bergmann v. Foreman
State Trust & Savings Bank, 273 Ill. App. 408 (1934) ; and Bear v. Milliken Trust
Co., 336 Ill. 366, 168 N. E. 349 (1929).
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earlier cases and, having done so, then turned to cases from other jurisdictions7 and the works of text writers s for support. The decision in that
respect is an interesting one for the court, while exercising equitable jurisdiction, seemingly took great pains to bring in a decision which would
hardly appear to be based on equitable principles of fairness and right
dealing when considered from the standpoint of its effect upon the defendant.
In that connection, it might be noted that the Pennsylvania case of
In re Tunnell's Estate,9 cited by the court in support of its decision, is
itself distinguishable. While it is true that the attempted inter-vivos trusts
there considered were invalidated, it was not because they involved attempts to make testamentary dispositions without a proper compliance
with statutory requirements for the execution of wills but because there
was a lack of sufficient proof as to the intent of the settlor to create trusts
in the first place. In much the same way, the emphasis given to one
passage in a text on the law of trusts to the effect that, unless the beneficiaries acquire an interest in the property prior to the settlor's death,
the transaction would be clearly testamentary and invalid in the event of
a failure to comply with the requirements of the statute of wills, 10 tends
to override other statements made by the same author. It has been said,
for example, that if an owner of property "transfers it in trust to pay
the income to the settlor for life and on his death to pay the principal to
others, the settlor reserving also the power to revoke the trust at any time
as long as he lives," such a trust would not be testamentary for the
reservation of a power of revocation would not prevent the creation of a
trust in the lifetime of the settlor, and the beneficiary would, at once,
acquire a "future interest" although it would be an interest "subject to
be divested by the exercise of the power."" The mere fact that the settlor
6The Kelly case, cited in note 4 ante, was distinguished on the ground the
deed in that case purported to be an absolute transfer to the trustees as of the
time of its execution rather than one which was not to take effect until after
the grantor's death. The Gurnett case, cited in note 5 ante, was distinguished
on the basis the corporate trustee there concerned would have active duties to
perform when the proceeds of certain insurance policies, intended to compose the
corpus of the trust, came into its hands.
7 Betker v. Nalley, 78 U. S. App. D. C. 312, 140 F. (2d) 171 (1944); Application of Gerchia, 279 App. Div. 734, 108 N. Y. S. (2d) 753 (1951) ; In re Tunnell's
Estate, 325 Pa. 554, 190 A. 906 (1944).
S Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (Vernon Law Book Co., Kansas City, 1935),
Vol. 1, § 1; Scott, The Law of Trusts (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1939), Vol. 1,
§ 56; Restatement, Trusts, Vol. 1, §§ 2 and 56.

9325 Pa. 554, 190 A. 906 (1944).
10 Scott, op. cit., Vol. 1, § 56, p. 327.

11 Ibid., Vol. 1, § 57(1), p. 336. A comparable provision appears in Restatement,
Trusts, Vol. 1, p. 174, comment (b). In another section, Scott states: "The
extent of the interest of the beneficiary must be definitely ascertained at the time
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made himself the trustee in addition to reserving a life interest and a
power of revocation should, likewise, not be enough to render the trust
12
invalid or testamentary in character.
There is reason to believe, then, that the court had ample authority
and precedent upon which it could have upheld the validity of the arrangement involved in the instant case but, while conceding the correctness thereof, it was not persuaded thereby. It remains to be seen whether
the decision will prove to be an isolated one or will be a forerunner of a
movement to turn away from the liberal tendency previously displayed.
If there is opportunity for choice between the two, the preference would
be in favor of the first of these views.

of the creation of the trust or ascertainable within the rule against perpetuities.
It may, however, be a future interest, and it may be either vested or contingent."
See Scott, op. cit., Vol. 1, § 129, p. 677. See also Restatement, Trusts, Vol. 1,
§ 129, p. 328, comment (b).
12 See annotation in 32 A. L. R. (2d) 1270, particularly p. 1286.

